Having as a starting point the overall business goals and objectives, the model drives the development of a strategy from the lower levels of securing data in storage and transition to the higher levels of business processes. Its use and applicability is demonstrated over``Billing Mall'' -a system for electronic bill presentation and payment.
Introduction
As organisations are rushing to revamp business models and align operations around e-commerce initiatives, information systems (IS) must be thought of as`s ervicescapes'' -enablers of a virtual realm where products and services exist as digital information and can be delivered through information-based channels (Wanninger et al., 1997; Papadopoulou et al., 2000) . It follows that the occurrence of business risks is now more eminent as the corporate network, processes, and critical business data are vulnerable to attacks by anyone having Internet access (Abela and Sacconaghi, 1997; Derivion Corp., 1999; Segev et al., 1998; Walker and Cavanaugh, 1998) . What has been observed, however, is that most organisations treat the Internet simply as a transport medium. The result as Segev et al. (1998) , noted, is that``. . . Internet security remains a relatively technical, local and distinct issue from the corporate level [IS] design and management''. We advocate that, as security is the dependent variable for the success of Web-based IS, the formation of any information Securing transactions over the Web 167 security strategy should begin by taking into account the business vision, goals and objectives. Furthermore, it should not be approached as an afterthought, but rather it has to be designed and evolve concurrently with the development of the system. Any other way to approach this issue will quickly lead to massive fraud, system failure, and acrimonious lawsuits (Hughes, 1997) . The definition of any effective information security strategy should thus be a well planned and concentrated effort initiated at the corporate level, and not be seen only as a local technology issue, or as an ad hoc mix of particular technical solutions to specific problems.
With this in mind, we offer an integrated approach to the development and implementation of an information security strategy for IS operating in Web environments. Based on a comprehensive, multi-level and multi-dimensional model, it defines the issues and sets the guidelines for infusing security both at a low and higher level. The section that follows presents the model and its building blocks for aiding the implementation of an effective security strategy. Its application is demonstrated in sections 3 and 4 over a Web-based electronic bill presentment and payment (EBPP) system developed for the Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), and currently in its deployment phase. A concluding discussion closes the article.
An information security strategy model
A long-held but false assumption is that security is largely a technological issue and an afterthought that has to be addressed during a system's implementation phase. Baskerville (1993) noted the existence of this developmental duality (the IS and its security are treated as separate developments), arguing that it may cause conflict and tension between a system and its security. The model that is presented herein was developed taking the above issue into consideration. It acquired an added importance as it was developed during our attempt to define an information security strategy for``Billing Mall'' -a system for on-line bill presentation and payment whose intended``security-sensitive'' users range from corporate customers to households.
The model, which is depicted in Figure 1 , portrays a cyclic iterative process for designing and deploying an information security strategy.
Each iteration is performed in the context of a phased IS development plan with the emphasis on the various activities and the level of engagement changing from one iteration to the next (see Figure 2) . The development phases closely resemble those of the rational unified process methodology (Kruchten, 2000) . In the inception phase of building the information security strategy, the focus is on gaining a high-level understanding of the overall security requirements and determining the scope of the development effort. In the elaboration phase the focus is on weighting risks and costs, whilst in the construction phase the focus shifts on design and implementation. Finally, in the transition phase, the focus is on ensuring that the system maintains the quality levels required in meeting business objectives. The steps identified, namely business needs analysis, risk analysis,security strategy 
Business needs analysis
Business needs analysis is the foundation step for creating and maintaining an information security strategy that correctly reflects the overall mission and goals of the organisation whilst identifying possible issues rising in cases where the system surpasses the organisation's boundaries and extends across multiple organizational entities. The analysis starts by identifying the objectives and business activities of the enterprise and its major units. Goals are set for each objective, and critical success factors (CSFs) are highlighted to emphasize what must go right if these are to be met. The information needed in order to draw specific security requirements for any identified critical resources is recorded as information sets. Figure 3 depicts the main information entities that need to be examined during this step. Each entity is represented by a rectangle. A line with an arrowhead drawn from one entity to another indicates that there is a relationship between them.
Risk analysis and cost assessment
The distributed nature of Web-based systems implies the existence of a multitude of vulnerabilities and threats which have to be thoroughly examined to guarantee a secure environment for commercial transactions. Risk analysis and cost assessment specifies against which threats the critical information resources identified in the previous step should be protected from. This has to be considered in conjunction with the cost of deploying the security strategy. Potential vulnerabilities and threats should be identified at all levels, including network services, architecture, operating systems and applications with the purpose of facilitating decision making about the desired level of security and identifying any corresponding risk management methods that should be adopted.
The information entities produced during this step are depicted in Figure 4 . As already mentioned, any CSFs and other information sets derived during the previous step are used in the analysis performed in this step, cross-referenced with the perceived risks.
Risk quantification should be undertaken including a cost assessment of the possible damage associated with each threat against the cost of preventing the threat in terms of time, expenses and resources. The identified risks should then be categorised according to their probability and the severity of their impacts (see Figure 5 ). Certainly one needs to consider first those threats 
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resulting in greater losses (classes D and C), but still not to ignore threats of less probable financial impact, which occur more frequently (class B). In completing this step the organisation should be able to outline strategic security objectives. These are general security objectives which may be defined, for instance, in terms of the levels of confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability that the enterprise wishes to attain. These objectives, along with the set of rules and practices that regulate how assets are administered, protected and distributed, should be described in detail in a corporate information security policy (CISP) document.
Security strategy implementation
The security strategy implementation step should aim to ensure the most effective use of resources and must constitute a consistent approach even in the case of different systems. The influence that the implementation step exerts upon the overall systems development lifecycle is twofold, as the information gathered during the previous steps is utilised to:
(1) identify security services that should be offered by technical infrastructure components, such as standard protocols and commercial off-the-shelf products; and (2) extend the system analysis and design tasks by infusing the security semantics of business processes.
The identification of security services involves the selection of those that need to be provided by the technical infrastructure in order to protect the organisation's information assets from known and unknown threats (see Figure 1 ). The process includes the analysis of a plethora of commercially available products and protocols by examining relevant industry reports and best practice guides. This is essential since not all security services can be used for the protection of all kinds of information resources -different classes of data require different levels of security. Classes of security services include integrity, confidentiality, authentication, accountability and auditing, authorisation, availability, and non-repudiation. In order to provide such services one has to consider the security mechanisms offered for data in transit, and the security mechanisms offered for data in storage. These are illustrated in Tables I and II respectively. When data in transit are considered (Table I) , protocols offering security services are divided into three main categories depending on the International Standards Organisation's (www.iso.ch) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layer they operate, namely the network, transport and the application layer. Furthermore, the application layer security mechanisms can be subdivided according to the specific structure and nature of the data they are targeting, differentiating sensitive from non-sensitive data.
Security for data in storage caters for the``enemy-within'', i.e. the employee who intentionally or accidentally may cause severe security incidents. This requires that security for data in storage should not only depend on the technology used, but also on the proper administration of systems, as well as the observance of related business procedures, physical access controls, and audit functions. Not all business requirements and objectives are identical. Consequently, security mechanisms for data in storage are not absolute -there is not one standard that will fit all cases. In Table II we present the dominant Our discussion thus far has focused on the implementation of a security strategy mainly at the lower infrastructure level. We agree with Baskerville (1993) that a security strategy should evolve concurrently with the design of the system and not be approached as an afterthought. As such, any integrated approach should address how security could be possibly implemented at a higher level, i.e. the business process level.
In order to arrive at a complete understanding of the security requirements at the business process level, Röhm et al. (1998) suggested examining a business transaction from at least five different perspectives/views, each one extended accordingly in order to capture the security semantics:
The business process view representing the flow of work in terms of activities and participating entities from the viewpoint of the whole business process. It is used both as a means to communicate the architecture of the system to the stakeholders and to guide the modelling efforts for the other four views.
The informational view representing the information entities, their structure and any relationships between them. The behavioural view showing what tasks and activities are associated with the various objects, the events that trigger these activities and the message exchanging that occurs between them. The dynamic view representing for each information entity all possible states and any transitions that may occur within the life cycle of the information entity. The structural view showing where and by whom tasks and activities are performed.
The above can guide the analyst towards acquiring a holistic view of any business process. We adopt those views, placing them within the security strategy implementation step of our model and defining the order in which they must be performed. Their practical application is demonstrated in the next main section of the paper.
Monitoring, research and analysis
The monitoring, research and analysis step can be performed using a plethora of tools widely available by software vendors such as audit log analysers and intrusion detection mechanisms. Their effective use may pinpoint the need for further analysis and a re-evaluation of the risk level in the context of``live'' operating conditions (indicated by the broken line connecting steps 4 and 2 in Figure 1 ). This exercise may identify implementation flaws or weaknesses of the current strategy, or serious gaps emanating from a change in the business scope and activities. In the former case the modification of existing security mechanisms or the addition of new ones might be deemed necessary. The latter case may constitute the starting point for radical changes in the security strategy, which have to be adequately addressed during subsequent iterations of the steps in the model. In this section we described a model for aiding the development of an information security strategy from a multi-level and multi-dimensional perspective. What follows is a description of how this model was used to implement the security strategy of``Billing Mall'' -an EBPP system developed for the Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE).
Applying the model`B
illing Mall'' (for a description see http://alexandra.di.uoa.gr) is a system that offers facilities for bill presentation and payment, customer application processing and personalised marketing (see Figure 6 ). The architectural model of the system is based on the open Internet billing (OIB) model. According to OIB, a central service provider, the consolidator, collects and stores electronic summary bills from registered billers. While offering a single point of access for viewing and paying bills, it provides the customer with the option to have access to the biller's Web site for detailed bill information. When the customer visits the Web site requesting to see a detailed bill, the biller presents him/her with informative messages regarding available products and services that can be purchased directly.
Following the steps prescribed by the model as presented in the previous section, a business needs analysis was conducted. It emphasised the fact that in order to mitigate the cost of deploying a secure communication mechanism for financial transactions between the consolidator and the banks, the existing infrastructure currently in use for fund transfer between financial institutions in Greece had to be leveraged. This implied the need for including an additional entity to the OIB model, the biller payment provider (see Figure 6 ), serving as an intermediary.
An excerpt of the information entities derived during the first step is presented in Tables III-V.
The resources that were to be protected were finalised at both organizational and inter-organizational levels during the second step. These corporate assets were deemed necessary to be protected from internal as well as external attacks, either intentional or accidental. An example of the risk analysis results is presented in Tables VI-IX. The security mechanisms required for managing the identified risks were identified next. Since the exchange of large amounts of financial information is involved, the first task was to evaluate the security features of existing protocols in the field. Between Open Financial Exchange (OFX) (www.ofx.net) and Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) (www.setco.org), the former was found more appropriate mainly because:
it is based on cryptographic protocols; it supports the use of channel-level as well as application-level security; and its security architecture is expandable and customisable. In addition, firewalls were selected as the first line of defence for all entities (excluding the customer) in the``Billing Mall'' system. It was suggested that important information should only be accepted from and delivered to servers with a specific IP address. Example procedures taking advantage of this feature were that:
the consolidator only accepts bill summary information from a small set of IP addresses in the biller's domain; and the consolidator only forwards customers' payment requests to the specific BPP IP address. 
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During the monitoring, research and analysis step it was revealed that the OIB model alone was not adequate to provide the anticipated level of security and reliability. It was subsequently extended in order to accommodate the establishment of a certification authority (CA) issuing and disseminating digital certificates to the customers (see Figure 3) . Furthermore, as a means for addressing the risk of insolvent customers, issuing payment transactions that could not be completed due to insufficient credit, a credit bureau entity was added to the architectural model of the system (see Figure 3) . The functional role of this entity is the provision of information related to the credit status of customers, eliminating the possibility of financial damage.
Infusing security semantics in process specifications
Our aim during the design of the``Billing Mall'' was that the objectives of the information security strategy had to be integrated in the development process.
In line with the suggestion by Röhm et al. (1998) as described elsewhere in this paper, we present an example of analysing the business process, informational and behavioural views of the``bill-payment-order'' business process (step 17 in Figure 6 ) and its security requirement``non-repudiation' ' (risk R4 in Table IX) . We use the following notation: components of existing model or attributes that are not affected by security requirements are described using normal text. The attributes with relevance to non-repudiation are given in bold face.
Business process view
The European Community's 1999/93EC Directive requires documents to be signed digitally in electronic business transactions. Examining this issue from a business process view perspective allows us to capture the security semantics of business transactions and integrate them in the design of the process.
Figures 7 and 8 depict graphically the``bill-payment-order'' process using Unified Modelling Language (UML) use case and activity diagrams. The use case diagram in Figure 7 depicts the scenarios and actors involved in the business process of our example, while Figure 8 shows the activities performed in completing the PayBill use case. In order to meet the```non-repudiation'' requirement, our model has been extended by the appropriate actors (certification authority, signature manager), use cases (certificate renewal, payment order archival) and activities (verify digital signature, verify certificate validity). 
Informational view
The same European Community directive requires that in order to sign an electronic document the``seal'' or digital signature of each signatory and the corresponding certificates are necessary. Accordingly, to carry out the``billpayment-order' ' process effectively and to establish non-repudiation, the informational view of the transaction had to be extended by information about the signatories, the certificates used, and the trusted parties responsible for issuing the certificates. The analysis and modelling can be performed using UML class diagrams. In Figure 9 we have extended the class diagram containing the customer-biller relationship of our example by appropriate classes and member fields necessary for supporting non-repudiation. These are: A new class certification authority.
A new association class certificate. Modification of the existing committal class by adding the appropriate fields for the digital signatures, and information about what algorithms were used for signing. The commital class is used to model any kind of document that should be signed by a customer (bill payment order), a biller (bill statement) or both (service level agreement).
In addition, customer and biller are manifestations of a generic type signer, which must have a certificate relating the signer to a certification authority.
Behavioural view
The interactions and corresponding information flows between the entities involved in the``bill-payment-order' ' process can be analysed through the behavioural view using UML sequence diagrams. In order to assure non- repudiation, the behavioural view of the process had to be modified as depicted in Figure 10 . The customer must digitally sign the bill payment order and the signature must be verified. In addition, because the certificate of a public key may have expired, further actions are necessary to guarantee the provability of digitally signed documents. These actions lead, for example, to extensions of the behavioural view of an object class (verifier) responsible for validating the integrity and provability of the payment order. Again, in Figure 10 necessary extensions due to security requirements are given in bold face (the sequence diagram has been enhanced by the use of scripts for accommodating complex scenarios involving conditions and iterations). Using the views suggested by Röhm et al. (1998) for analysing and modelling the security semantics of business processes, this section offered an example of a single transaction and the security requirements that had to be infused and performed by the``Billing Mall''. It becomes clear that by modelling and analysing the security semantics of the business transactions it supports, the IS and its security are not treated as separate developments. As the former becomes part of the design process, the possible duality as a cause for conflict (Baskerville, 1993 ) is eliminated. 
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Conclusions
In this article we presented an integrated approach for the development of an information security strategy based on a rigorous multi-level and multidimensional model. The position that any security strategy must evolve concurrently with the design of the system and not be approached as an afterthought is reflected in the model, which monitors closely the development phases of an IS, and addresses security at the business process level. Enabling the practitioner to evaluate and use the available security tools and techniques in a consistent manner, the structure of the model enforces the view that any security strategy must be conducted primarily at a higher level, and not be seen merely as a local technology issue. Without doubt we believe that the approach presented herein could be further refined and enhanced. We hope that its further adoption will result in any necessary enhancements or modifications, incrementing thus its value regarding its practical applicability.``Waterproof'' security of large, inter-organizational systems is an issue of immense complexity, but we believe that we have at least made a few but necessary steps towards meeting this challenge.
